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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION - THIRD CIR-
CUiT HOLDS THAT PRAYER AT GRADUATION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
EVEN IF IT RESULTS FROM A STUDENT VOTE. - ACLU v. Black Horse
Pike Regional Board of Education, 84 F.3 d 1471 (3 d Cir. 1996).
Despite the Supreme Court's 1992 holding in Lee v. Weisman1 that
state-sponsored prayer during a public school graduation ceremony vi-
olates the Establishment Clause, 2 the issue of graduation prayer has
recently resurfaced. Seeking to avoid Lee's prohibition, school boards
have allowed students to decide by majority vote whether prayer will
occur at graduation. 3 The Third Circuit recently held, however, that
these state-authorized student referenda regarding prayer violate the
Establishment Clause.4 In ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board
of Education,5 the court properly recognized the danger that popular
votes could pose to the protections of the Establishment Clause, yet
wisely stopped short of forbidding all forms of graduation prayer.
In May 1993, the Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education
("Board') ended its tradition of including an invocation in its high
school graduation ceremony.6 Instead, the Board adopted a policy that
allowed the graduating students to decide whether to include prayer in
the ceremony, as well as what the content of that prayer would be.7
Shortly thereafter, a slim plurality of the Highland Regional High
School senior class voted to have a prayer at graduation." The ACLU
and a Highland graduating senior subsequently petitioned a federal
court in New Jersey to enjoin any student-led prayer as a violation of
the First Amendment.9 After the district court denied this request, the
plaintiffs filed an emergency appeal with the Third Circuit, where a
two-judge panel reversed and entered a preliminary injunction prohib-
1 SOS U.S. 577 (1992).
2 See id. at 586-87. The Establishment Clause states that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion." U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
3 See Rick A. Swanson, 7ime for a Change: Analyzing Graduation Invocations and Benedic-
tions Under Religiously Neutral Principles of the Public Forum, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1405, 1409
n.ai (x996) (discussing controversies involving student-led graduation prayers).
4 The decision in ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education, 84 F.3d 1471 (3d
Cir. x996), widens a split in the lower courts over this issue. Compare id. at 1474 (finding an
Establishment Clause violation when students voted for prayer), Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No.
241, 4 F.3d 447, 458 (9th Cir. 1994) (same), vacated as moot, TiS S. Ct. 2604 (x995), and Gearon
v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, o99 (E.D. Va. 1993) (same), with Jones v. Clear
Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 964 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding no Establishment Clause viola-
tion), and Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 85x F. Supp. 446, 456 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (same).
S 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996).
6 See id. at 1474.
7 See id. at 1475. The policy allowed the senior class to choose among offering a prayer,
observing a moment of reflection, or having nothing at all. See id.
8 See id. One hundred twenty-eight seniors voted for prayer, one hundred twenty voted for
a moment of silence, and twenty voted to have neither. See id.
9 See id. at 1475-76.
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iting prayer at the graduation. 10 The district court then made the in-
junction permanent, and the Board appealed."
Sitting en banc, nine judges for the Third Circuit affirmed. 12 The
court analyzed the implications of the Establishment Clause for stu-
dent-led prayer under both the framework articulated in Lee13 and the
test announced in Lemon v. Kurtznun.14 Although it conceded that
the state's involvement was "certainly less evident" in this case than in
Lee, the court relied heavily on Lee's language and logic.' s It detailed
the ways in which the state immersed itself in the planning, organiza-
tion, and coordination of the Highland ceremony, 16 and it concluded
that the prayer subjected those students who did not vote for prayer
to the coercion criticized by the Supreme Court in Lee. 17
Turning to the Lemon test, the court responded skeptically to the
Board's purported secular purpose - to solemnize the occasion - by
expressing doubt that "graduation would be any less solemn if stu-
dents were not permitted to vote for prayer."' 8 The court emphasized
that the voting procedure was unconstitutional - regardless of its
purpose - because its effect was to communicate to religious minori-
ties that they were not "full members of the political community."' 9
Ultimately, the court was convinced that the procedure sought "to ac-
commodate the preference of some at the expense of others" and there-
fore "cross[ed] the required line of neutrality."20
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Mansmann 2' argued that the major-
ity had expanded the reach of the Establishment Clause to the detri-
10 See id. at r476.
11 See id.
12 See id. at 1474. Chief judge Sloviter, and Judges Becker, Stapleton, Greenberg, Scirica,
Cowen, Lewis, and Sarokin joined Judge McKee's opinion.
13 The Supreme Court in Lee primarily examined two issues: the extent to which the state
had exerted control over the ceremony, see Lee v. Weisman, 5o5 U.S. 577, 590 (x992), and the
degree to which the students had been coerced into participating, see id. at 593.
14 403 U.S. 602 (,973). Under the Lemon test, a government practice must satisfy three re-
quirements to avoid violating the Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an 'excessive government entanglement with
religion.'" Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)).
Is Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1479-8o. In Lee, the school principal decided that prayer would
be included in the ceremony, chose the religious speaker, and determined part of the prayer's
content. See id. (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 587).
16 See id.
17 See id. at 1480.
18 Id. at 1485.
19 Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (x984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
20 Id. at 1488. The court declined to address the Lemon test's third prong - the question of
"excessive entanglement," Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 - because it found that the Board's policy
violated the test's first two prongs. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1488.
21 Judges Nygaard, Alito, and Roth joined Judge Mansmann's opinion.
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ment of the students' free exercise and free speech rights.22  The
dissent noted that only a compelling state interest, such as avoiding a
violation of the Establishment Clause, could justify an infringement of
those First Amendment rights.23 It concluded that the Board's policy
did not violate the Establishment Clause because the "highly demo-
cratic" nature of the student vote satisfied both the Lee criteria and
the Lemon test.24 In the dissent's view, no other compelling state in-
terest justified the extreme measure of issuing an injunction. 2s
The dissent failed to recognize that using a political process to ad-
vance a religious majority's goals flouts the very purpose of the Estab-
lishment Clause: to protect religious minorities. 26  The First
Amendment has never implied a right on the part of a majority -
much less a plurality - to override the fundamental protections that
the Constitution accords all Americans.27 One of the purposes of the
Bill of Rights was "to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majori-
ties."28 A vote by students - far from being the "exercise in responsi-
ble citizenship" described by the dissent 29 - amplifies, rather than
reduces, the danger that a majority will bring intimidating pressures to
bear in favor of a particular religion. The peer pressures inherent in
the public school setting30 may produce unsavory campaigning in the
cafeteria and inappropriate lobbying between classes.31 Government-
sponsored referenda concerning public prayer could further fragment
the school community, as religious minorities would be forced to rec-
ognize the beliefs of the majority, but would not be given a public
22 See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1489 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
23 See id.
24 Id. at 149o. According to the dissent, the student vote allowed the Board to maintain a
position of "strict neutrality" toward religion, id., and eliminated the "psychological coercion" ob-
jected to in Lee, id. at 1492. The dissent further reasoned that the vote permitted every graduate
to "partake in the community," thereby reducing any feelings of exclusion potentially caused by
the prayer. Id. at 1494. Finally, the dissent argued that the student vote policy served an educa-
tional, secular purpose by teaching students to resolve the issue of graduation prayer indepen-
dently. See id.
2S See id. at 1497.
26 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (i962) ("Our Founders were no[t] willing to let the
content of their prayers and their privilege of praying whenever they pleased be influenced by the
ballot box . . . ."); cf West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)
("[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote .. .
27 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985).
28 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638, cited in Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1478.
29 Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1494 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
30 The Supreme Court has consistently enforced a strict standard of religious neutrality in the
public school setting because children are more susceptible to religious indoctrination than adults.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (i987).
31 Cf. Engel, 370 U.S. at 429 (recognizing the "anguish, hardship and bitter strife" that results




outlet through which to express their own views.3 2 Such referenda de-
value the majority's religion as well; the voting process subjects a
highly personal and individualized conviction to a public procedure
that demeans and debases any prayer that it produces. 33
Creating these hazards cannot be justified by arguing that the stu-
dent vote eliminates state responsibility and therefore does not impli-
cate the Establishment Clause.34 As the majority noted, the state was
intimately involved in the student vote:35 the Board deliberately cre-
ated and enforced the mechanism by which religion could be incorpo-
rated into the graduation ceremony,36 and then placed its authority
behind the vote's results.3 7 Not only was the vote state action, but the
graduation ceremony itself also served an overt state function.38  In
short, the vote did not remove the state's imprimatur; rather, it al-
lowed a plurality of students to use the "machinery of the State" to
further a religious agenda.3 9
Black Horse addressed only voted-for prayer; other forms of public
graduation prayer by students may still be acceptable if certain criteria
are met.40 For example, the policy that chooses student speakers must
presumably be religiously neutral - such as choosing the speaker
based on grade-point average or random selection - and not easily
dominated by a politically active religious majority.41 Under this as-
32 See generally The Supreme Court, zipz Term - Leading Cases, xo6 HARV. L. REv. 163,
268 (1992) ("[G]overnmental preference of a religion also weakens the political community itself;
exclusion weakens the disfavored individuals' attachment to and participation in the community,
and thereby produces divisiveness.").
33 See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1485; cf. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431 ("[A] union of government and
religion tends to ... degrade religion."). The vote produces a "theologically and liturgically thin"
prayer that diminishes the important role private religion plays in many people's lives. Douglas
Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. Rv. 373, 38o (1992).
34 See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1490-93 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). This line of reasoning has
been developed by other courts. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 968
(5th Cir. 1992); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 85x F. Supp. 446, 455 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
35 See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1478-79.
36 By allowing the students to choose only among prayer, silence, or nothing, the school "in-
vited" religion but did not "invite" other types of speakers. Cf. Capitol Square Review and Ad-
visory Bd. v. Pinette, 125 S. Ct. 2440, 2448-49 (1995) ("[G]iving sectarian religious speech
preferential access to a forum close to the seat of government (or anywhere else for that matter)
would violate the Establishment Clause . . ").
37 See Engel, 370 U.S. at 431 ("When the power, prestige and financial support of government
is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minori-
ties to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.").
38 Moreover, attendance was compelled, even if it was not technically mandatory. See Lee v.
Weisman, 5o5 U.S. 577, 592-93, 596 (2992).
39 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (z963).
40 Although the dissent claimed that the court implemented a per se rule against all prayer at
graduation, see Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1496 (Mansmann, J., dissenting), the decision is not that
far-reaching, see Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 2488 (interpreting the district court's permanent injunc-
tion to apply only to the Board's policy of requiring a student vote).
41 See Swanson, supra note 3, at 1433 (arguing that the Court should consider graduation a
"public forum" and allow graduation prayer if the school allows "equal access . . . by religious
[Vol. 11o:781
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sumption, a school valedictorian would be able to thank God (or Al-
lah, or Nietzsche, or no one) during her address without violating the
Establishment Clause, because the process by which the valedictorian
is chosen - based on academic performance - is neutral, well
known, and open to all.42 Therefore, the connection between the vale-
dictorian's speech and the religious preferences of school administra-
tors is tenuous at best, and the possibility that state action has
produced any religious coercion is minimal. Indeed, once the school
gives a student access to the graduation forum, it arguably can no
more prohibit her from delivering a prayer than mandate that prayer
occur.
4 3
Deciding whether a school violates the Establishment Clause
would be more difficult if the neutrally chosen student delivered an
"invocation," rather than a valedictory address. 44 An invocation carries
with it a historical connection to state-sponsored prayer45 and these
connotations might cause some audience members distress. Neverthe-
less, the state has an interest in providing "solemnizing" moments in
order to demonstrate the seriousness of the occasion.46 As long as the
school chooses the speaker for these "solemnizing" moments through a
neutral method - and therefore a prayer is neither expected nor en-
sured - the government will not be excessively connected with the
student's speech.47 Additionally, each individual student, once given
and nonreligious speakers, and that access is determined on the basis of a religiously-neutral
principle").
42 Cf Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist, 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993)
(allowing school property to be used for religious purposes, even though no public forum had
been created, because the property was open for use by a wide variety of private organizations).
43 Cf. Board of Educ. of the Westside Comm. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (i99o) (al-
lowing schools to give student religious clubs equal access to the use of public school space during
after-school hours).
44 Similar difficulties would arise if the valedictorian led the audience in prayer - rather
than merely recited her own personal prayer. Compare Goluba v. School Dist. of Ripon, 45 F.3d
1035, 1040 (7th Cir. 1995) (arguing that, although a school could not prevent an individual stu-
dent from engaging in private prayer at graduation, the school would be in "constitutional compli-
ance" if it "appropriately restrain[ed] an individual from temporarily converting graduation into a
prayer meeting") with Bauchman v. West High Sch., 9o6 F. Supp. 1483, r494 (D. Utah 1995)
(finding that a high school had no control over a graduation crowd that spontaneously sang reli-
gious songs and holding that the school therefore did not violate an injunction that prohibited the
singing of those songs during the ceremony).
45 Cf Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-88, 792 (1983) (upholding the use of prayer to
open a state's legislative assembly by recognizing the invocation's long history and distinguishing
the setting from that of a school by noting that the possibility of coercion is reduced if the prayer
involves adults).
46 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Importantly,
these ceremonies can have "solemnizing" moments without referring to religion at all. See School
Dist of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 281 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that readings from the works of great Americans, or from the "documents of our heritage of
liberty" could serve "solely secular purposes" without jeopardizing religious liberties).
47 Cf. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 25o, 25x6 (i995) ("In




the opportunity to speak, should have sole control over the religious -
or nonreligious - message of her speech.48 Moreover, unlike a stu-
dent referendum, a "neutral process" would produce many different
solemnizing methods over time and give various members of the stu-
dent community access to the podium. This variety would further re-
duce the connection between any particular message and the school.
Admittedly, such a process might frequently produce a majority prayer
if conducted in a homogeneous community, or in a community with a
staunch tradition of state-sponsored invocational prayer.49 However,
requiring that all solemnizing speeches be secular would run afoul of
the "viewpoint-neutrality" that the Supreme Court has required in reg-
ulating speech,50 and would force school officials into the unenviable
position of censoring a student's speech based solely on her religious
views.-"
The Third Circuit vigorously protected the rights of religious mi-
norities and was not fooled by the "democratic" rationalizations that
the dissent offered in defense of the student vote. The court recog-
nized that the student-vote policy could not be religiously neutral:
democratic decisionmaking necessarily favors the majority religion.
Yet the court properly did not forbid all prayer. Graduation prayer
that is the individual expression of a neutrally-selected speaker -
rather than the state-authorized litany of a political majority - should
still be constitutional.
48 See Johanna J. Raimond, Note, The Constitutionality of Student-Led Prayer at Public
School Graduation Ceremonies, 48 VAND. L. Rav. 257, 289-90 (1995) (arguing that spontaneous
student prayer at graduation is constitutional, but recommending continued judicial vigilance to
ensure against informal school coercion). This freedom is of course limited by the school's power
to forbid speech that would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of ap-
propriate discipline in the operation of the school." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
49 See Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 827, 831 (Wzth Cir. 1989) (holding
that presenting a prayer before high school football games violates the Establishment Clause, even
if the speaker is chosen randomly).
50 See Rosenberger, x5 S. Ct. at 2518 C'It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and
an atheistic perspective on the debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet another political,
economic, or social viewpoint."). Rosenberger, which involved speech in religious publications,
may be distinguishable from religious speech at graduation because the school ceremony involves
a captive audience; the presence of captive listeners may lead the Court to balance the constitu-
tional rights involved differently. Cf. id. at 2524-25 (holding that a state university would not
violate the Establishment Clause by funding a religious publication if the university's funding
policy for student publications was neutral towards religion, because denying funding based on
religion would amount to "viewpoint discrimination").
S1 Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 n.ii (198i) (arguing that a university "would risk
greater entanglement [with religion] by attempting to enforce [an] exclusion of religious worship
and religious speech" than by striving for viewpoint neutrality, because determining "which words
and activities" fall within the religious category "could prove 'an impossible task in an age where
many and various beliefs meet the constitutional definition of religion'" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 93x, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
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SEXUAL HARASSMENT - TITLE IX - FIFTH CIRCUIT HOLDS SCHOOL
DISTRICT NOT LIABLE FOR STUDENT-TO-STUDENT SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT. - Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District, 80 F.3d ioo6
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3033 (U.S. Oct. 7, I996) (No. 96-4).
As Title IX1 claims for hostile learning environments created by
peer sexual harassment have begun to proliferate, 2 this issue has leapt
into the public eye.3 Last April, in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent
School District,4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit foreclosed one avenue of relief for victims of such harassment,
holding that Title IX does not impose liability on school districts for
third-party seiual harassment., However, the court's restrictive ap-
proach to statutory interpretation failed to provide a persuasive justifi-
cation for excluding peer sexual harassment from the scope of Title
Ix.
Sisters Jane and Janet Doe, both eighth grade students at Sam
Rayburn Middle School in the Bryan Independent School District in
Texas, allegedly experienced numerous episodes of physical and verbal
sexual harassment that occurred primarily on the school bus.6 At dif-
ferent times during the school year, Jane and Janet's parents spoke
with various school officials.7 The school suspended one male student
for three days, but the incidents continued until the girls' mother,
Debra Rowinsky, removed her daughters from the bus.8 Rowinsky
sued the school district under Title IX on her daughters' behalf.9
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
granted summary judgment to the school district. 10 The court held
1 Ttle IX provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any edu-
cation program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " 20 U.S.C. § i68i(a) (1994).
2 See, e.g., Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., No. C93-ooI23CW, 1996 WL 432298, at *13
(N.D. Cal. July 22, i996).
3 Within the past few years, both California and Minnesota have enacted laws requiring
schools to distribute sexual harassment policies to students. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 212.6 (West
1994); MINN. STAT. § 127.46 (z994). In addition, a public uproar erupted last fall over the sus-
pension of a six-year-old boy from elementary school for kissing a female classmate. See Katy
Kelly & David J. Lynch, Smooch Lands zst-Grader in Hot Water, Headlines, USA TODAY, Sept.
26, 1996, at iA.
4 80 F.3d ioo6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3033 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 96-4).
S See id. at xoo8.
6 For instance, one male student identified as "G.S." regularly swatted Jane and Janet on the
buttocks as they walked down the bus aisle and, on several occasions, groped their genital areas
and breasts. See id. G.S. once called Janet a "whore" and frequently made remarks such as:
"When are you going to let me fuck you?", "What bra size are you wearing?", and "What size
panties are you wearing?" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
7 See id. at xooS-g.
8 See id.
9 See id. at Ioog-Io.
10 See id. at IOIO.
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that Rowinsky had failed to state a claim under Title IX because she
had not provided evidence that the school district had discriminated
against students on the basis of sex.1'
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment by a 2-1 vote.12 Writing
for the majority, Judge Smith' 3 held that Title IX does not impose
liability on a school district for its knowing failure to halt peer hostile
environment sexual harassment, absent proof that the school district
itself directly discriminated based on sex. 14 Finding the statutory text
ambiguous, Judge Smith relied on three contextual factors in interpret-
ing Title IX to impose liability only for the acts of grant recipients.'-
First, the majority analyzed the scope of Title IX as a whole.
Judge Smith reasoned that "[i]mposing liability for the, acts of third
parties would be incompatible with the purpose of a spending condi-
tion, because grant recipients have little control over the multitude of
third parties who could conceivably violate the prohibitions of title
IX."16 Thus, he concluded that the "more probable inference is that
[Title IX's spending] condition prohibits certain behavior by the grant
recipients themselves";17 otherwise, grant recipients would be induced
to refuse the grants rather than risk third-party liability. Furthermore,
the majority emphasized that, with the exception of one phrase, the
statute discusses discrimination only by grant recipients.' 8
The majority then examined Title IX's legislative history. Judge
Smith noted that, in the congressional debates surrounding Title IX's
passage, both supporters and opponents of the bill had discussed only
acts by grant recipients. 19 He also emphasized that Congress had ex-
plicitly acknowledged the limited scope of Title X. 20 For example,
Title IX's sponsor admitted that Title IX "is not a panacea" for all
forms of discrimination.21 Judge Smith buttressed this view by noting
that the "Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the purpose of title
IX is to prevent discrimination by grant recipients."22
Lastly, the majority found that refusing to impose liability would
be consistent with the interpretation of Title IX adopted by the Office
of Civil Rights (OCR).23 After characterizing the implementing regula-
11 See id.
12 See id. at ioo8.
13 Judge Garwood joined the majority opinion.
14 See Rowinsky, 8o F.3d at ioo8.
Is See id. at 1012.
16 Id. at 1013 (footnote omitted).
17 Id.
18 See id.
19 See id. at 1014.
20 See id.
21 Id. (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 58o8 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
22 Id. at 1z3.
23 See id. at 1014.
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tions24 as OCR's "primary interpretation" of Title IX, Judge Smith
concluded that the regulations could not be read to include the actions
of third parties.25 Moreover, he found that OCR's most definitive
statement on sexual harassment was a 1981 policy memorandum that
defined sexual harassment as conduct "by an employee or agent of the
recipient."2 6 Judge Smith declined to accord much weight to other
OCR documents that implied a different interpretation of Title IX, be-
cause these Letters of Finding were merely ad hoc attempts to induce
compliance in unique factual settings.2 7 Likewise, even though OCR's
interpretation of Title VI28 would impose liability on grant recipients
for hostile environments caused by peer racial harassment,2 9 Judge
Smith resisted Rowinsky's analogy to that statute because OCR's Title
VI interpretation lacked a "reasoned explanation."30
Judge Dennis dissented, challenging the majority's conclusion that
the school district had no duty to protect students from hostile envi-
ronments created by peer sexual harassment.31 He relied on Franklin
v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 32 which held that Title IX con-
tains an implied right of action for damages by a female student for
hostile environment sexual harassment perpetrated by a school district
employee.33 Because the Franklin Court cited an employment discrim-
ination case under Title VI,34 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vin-
son,35 as precedent for its interpretation of Title X,3 6 Judge Dennis
maintained that the Court had intended to import the Title VII hostile
environment standards "applied or adverted to" in Meritor into Title
24 See 34 C.F.R. § 1o6.31 (1995). Section io6.3i(a) provides that "no person shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any academic ... program or activity operated by a recipient." Id. § xo6.3I(a). Sec-
tion io6.3i(b)(7) states that a recipient shall not, on the basis of sex, "[o]therwise limit any person
in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity." Id. § io6.3i(b)(7).
25 Rowinsky, 8o F.3d at ioi5.
26 Id. at ioiS (quoting OCR Policy Memorandum from Antonio J. Califa, Director of Litiga-
tion, Enforcement, and Policy Service, to Regional Civil Rights Directors (Aug. 3, Ig8x)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The memorandum explicitly noted that student-to-student sexual har-
assment was an "unresolved issue." OCR Policy Memorandum, supra, quoted in Rowiusky, So
F.3d at zoiS.
27 See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at iois.
28 Title VI reads: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 43 U.S.C.
§ 2ood (994).
29 See Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational Institutions, S9 Fed.
Reg. 11,448, 11,449 (x994).
30 Rowinsky, 80 F.3 d at ioi6.
31 See id. at ioi6 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
32 So3 U.S. 6o (1992).
33 See id. at 71-73.
34 Title VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace. See 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2 (1994).
3S 477 U.S. 57 (x986).
36 See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
19971
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IX claims.37 Reasoning that the case of non-employee harassment was
implicit in the Franklin Court's holding,38 Judge Dennis concluded
that the school district could be held liable for allowing hostile envi-
ronments created by peer sexual harassment if it had knowledge of the
harassment and failed to take corrective action.39
By affirming the district court's decision in Rowinsky, the Fifth
Circuit not only split with the Eleventh Circuit,40 but also failed to
explain persuasively its refusal to apply Title IX to cases of third-
party sexual harassment. The majority's interpretation of Title IX's
scope rests on two false premises. First, the majority's conclusion that
imposing liability for the acts of students would deter schools from
accepting grants assumes that, despite the best efforts of school dis-
tricts, peer sexual harassment is inevitable. 41 Although school districts
do have substantial control over their students,42 most school districts
have not attempted to address the problem of peer harassment 43 be-
cause - absent the threat of Title IX liability - they have little in-
centive to do so. The majority's second flawed assumption is that, if
Title IX did impose liability on school districts for peer sexual harass-
ment, the standard would automatically be strict liability.44 Although
it is unclear whether a negligence standard or an intent standard
would apply under Title IX,45 no case has suggested that strict liabil-
37 Rowinsky, So F.3d at 1020 (Dennis, J., dissenting). Title VII liability for hostile environ-
ment harassment will apply when the victim is a member in a protected group, there is an abu-
sive environment, and the employer has actual or constructive notice of the hostile environment
yet fails to take corrective action. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., No. C93-ooxz3CW, 1996
WL 432298, at *II (N.D. Cal. July 22, 1996).
38 See id. at 1021-22 (citing Menitor, 477 U.S. at 65-67).
39 See id. at 1023.
40 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1iB6, 1193 (xith Cir. 1996) (holding
that "Title IX encompasses claims for damages due to a sexually hostile educational environment
created by a fellow student or students when the supervising authorities knowingly fall to act to
eliminate harassment" (footnote omitted)).
41 See Rowinsky, So F.3d at 1o3 ("[Gjrant recipients have little control over the multitude of
third parties who could conceivably violate the prohibitions of title IX.).
42 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, iiS S. Ct. 2386, 2391-92 ('993) (justifying a urinal-
ysis drug test requirement for high school athletes in part because the state, acting in loco paren-
tis, has a tutelary duty to promote and inculcate good morals, health, and self-discipline among
its students). As Judge Dennis recognized, this degree of control is "sufficient to apply tort liabil-
ity for the knowing failure of a school receiving federal funds to act in accordance with its statu-
tory duty to prevent sex discrimination in the school." Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1024 n.9 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
43 See NAN STEIN, NANCY L. MARSHALL & LINDA R. TRupP, SECRETS IN PUBLIC: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS II (1993) (estimating that 82% of schools fall to deal with sexual
harassment).
44 Cf. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at ioii n.iI ("In the context of two students,.., there is no power
relationship, and a theory of respondeat superior has no precedential or logical support.").
45 See Gail Sorenson, Commentary, Peer Sexual Harassment: Remedies and Guidelines Under
Federal Law, 92 Educ. L. Rep. (West) i, 5-6 (1994); see also Rowinsky, So F.3d at 1023-24
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (stating that the Franklin Court may have intended to limit Title IX's
implied right of action to situations in which the recipient has actual or constructive knowledge of
a violation, rather than to apply a negligence standard).
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ity would be imposed for third-party acts. 46 The majority's mistaken
assumptions led to the wrong conclusion: instead of being inconsistent
with Title IX's spending condition, imposing liability for student acts
would induce recipients to take reasonable steps to eliminate this
harassment.
Furthermore, the majority's reliance on the congressional debates
surrounding Title IX to restrict the statute's scope ignores the
Supreme Court's instruction that Title IX should be read broadly to
give effect to its remedial purposes. Several Supreme Court decisions
have indicated that courts interpreting Title IX should not be con-
strained by congressional debates;47 instead, courts should accord Title
IX "a sweep as broad as its language."48  For example, even though
Congress did not expressly authorize a private right of action under
Title IX, the Supreme Court found an implied right of action for in-
junctive relief in the statutory text.49 Years later, the Court held that
Title IX even authorizes an award of monetary damages.50 These de-
cisions reflect an expansive vision of Title IX.
Ultimately, the majority's effort to preempt - rather than defer to
- OCR's interpretation of Title IX betrays itself. The court properly
tried to ascertain whether OCR had formulated a policy regarding
school district liability for peer sexual harassment.5' However, the ma-
jority's suggestion that OCR's implementing regulations clarify this
ambiguity is disingenuous: the language of the regulations is nearly as
broad as Title IX's statutory language.5 2 In his search for a definitive
interpretation, Judge Smith accorded little deference to OCR's Letters
of Finding because, he argued, none of the traditional factors support-
ing deference was present.5 3 Yet these letters clearly evince OCR's in-
terpretation that Title IX imposes liability on school districts for peer
46 See Rowinsky, 8o F.3d at I02o n.7 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
47 See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) (noting that the "legis-
lative history of a statute that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be
equally silent or ambiguous on the question").
48 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United States v. Price,
383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
49 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717.
SO See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).
S1 According to the rule laid down in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), if a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, a
court must defer to an agency's interpretation if such interpretation is based on a "permissible
construction of the statute." Id. at 842-44.
52 Compare 34 C.F.R. § IO6.31 (I995) ("[No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any aca-
demic . . . program or activity operated by a recipient . . . ."), With 20 U.S.C. § 168i(a) (I994)
("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance . ").
S3 See Rowinsky, 8o F.3d at ioi5. Judge Smith's opinion implies that these factors include
proper deliberation by the agency, universal applicability, and finality. See id.
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sexual harassment.5 4 The consistency of the position adopted in
OCR's letters over time and changing circumstances strongly suggests
that the letters embody OCR's interpretation of Title IX regarding
student-to-student sexual harassment. Consequently, the Rowinsky
court should have deferred to OCR's conclusion that school districts
can be liable under Title IX for third-party harassment.
Moreover, OCR's interpretation of Title VI complements this view.
Judge Smith's rationale for dismissing OCR's position that Title VI
prohibits peer hostile environment racial harassment - that the posi-
tion lacked a reasoned explanation - is disingenuous. OCR justified
its position that "[a] recipient has subjected an individual to different
treatment on the basis of race if it has effectively caused, encouraged,
accepted, tolerated or failed to correct a racially hostile environment of
which it has actual or constructive notice"55 by reasoning that "an al-
leged harasser need not be an agent or employee of the recipient, be-
cause this theory of liability under title VI is premised on a recipient's
general duty to provide a nondiscriminatory educational environ-
ment."56 Given OCR's reasoned explanation for its interpretation of
Title VI and the Title IX Letters of Finding, the reasonable conclusion
is that OCR interpreted Title IX to extend liability to school districts
for hostile environments created by peer sexual harassment.
The Fifth Circuit's three justifications for limiting the scope of Ti-
tle IX to the discriminatory acts of school districts - the statute's
scope, legislative history, and regulatory treatment - actually lead to
the conclusion that Title IX liability should extend to the acts of third
parties. First, the scope of Title IX ought to be broad, thus recom-
mending the imposition of liability on school districts for third-party
actions to induce them to take the necessary steps to decrease occur-
rences of peer sexual harassment. Second, the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements on Title IX's applicability clearly specify a broader scope
than that discussed in the statute's legislative history. Finally, OCR's
interpretation of Title IX supports Title IX liability for the acts of
third parties. Thus, the Fifth Circuit considered the correct factors in
interpreting Title IX, but it reached the wrong conclusion.
54 See, e.g., Letter from Kenneth A. Mines, Regional Director, OCR, to Judyth Dobbert, Su-
perintendent, Albion Public Schools 3 (Apr. 7, 1994) (on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary) C'[A] recipient violates Title IX when it knew or should have known that a sexually hostile
environment exists due to student-to-student harassment and falls to take effective corrective ac-
tion."). In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Co1P., 496 U.S. 633 (iggo), the Supreme Court
held that three agency opinion letters were sufficient to demonstrate that the agency had a clear
statutory interpretation that was entitled to deference. See id. at 642, 648.
5 Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational Institutions, 59 Fed.
Reg. 1,448
, 
Id.49 4994).56 Id.
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